At the beginning of June, the Governing Council had asked Iran to conclude «immediately and unconditionally» an AP.30 to Iran in October 2003, to voluntarily sign and implement an AP as part of an agreement with the EU, in order to prevent the Governing Council from ensuring that Iran does not comply with its protection agreement and that Iran reports to the UN Security Council. According to ElBaradei in November, this is an important development, as «the IAEA`s ability to draw conclusions about the nature of Iran`s nuclear program and the accuracy and completeness of Iran`s declaration on its nuclear activities will depend to a large extent on the Agency`s ability to enable Iran to fully implement the review measures provided for in the guarantee agreement and the additional protocol.» Iran signed its AP in December to divert a report from the Committee on Iran`s non-compliance to the Security Council and allow Tehran to «manage the political and other pressures that existed on Iran.» 31 Iran told ElBaradei and the EU that it would «accept the provisional implementation of the PA and pursue a policy of full transparency as a measure of confidence.» 32 In 2003, the IAEA was in the process of adapting its guarantee system in the long term in order to discover the type of undeclared activities that the IAEA was now to discover in Iran. The POP was established in 1997, but Iran had not completed an PA. The spectacular discovery of a large-scale centrifuge enrichment plant hidden in Natanz, at the origin of the Iranian crisis, was revealed by the secret services, not by IAEA pickaxe work. In 2002, Member States informed the IAEA of this discovery and the IAEA followed up this information with Iran.18 On 14 July 2015, Iran and its six negotiating parties concluded that the JCPOA should resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran`s nuclear programme. The agreement was the result of a 12-year diplomatic process aimed at pushing back Iran`s obligations on nuclear transparency and withholding on the other six sides` obligations to lift economic sanctions on Iran. Prior to the closing of the JCPOA in November 2013, Iran and the six parties agreed on the Joint Action Plan (JPA), an interim agreement that should pave the way for a final settlement. The second part of the «93-2 programme» required a formal extension of the Agency`s legal mandate in the form of an additional protocol, to be adopted by each NPT member, in order to complement its existing IAEA safeguard agreement. On 15 May 1997, the IAEA adopted a model Memorandum of Understanding. The core of the additional protocol is to transform the IAEA guarantee regime from a quantitative system focused on accounting for known quantities of materials and monitoring declared activities into a qualitative system to obtain an overview of a state`s nuclear and nuclear activities, including all nuclear imports and exports. The additional protocol also significantly expands the IAEA`s ability to search for secret nuclear facilities, giving the Authority the power to visit any declared or unreported body to examine issues or inconsistencies in a state`s nuclear declarations. The parties to the NPT are not required to adopt an additional protocol, although the IAEA invites all to do so. In the 1990s, the IAEA secretariat had to involve its Member States in the design process to strengthen security arrangements, as the secretariat wanted additional legal powers under the POP.
However, since the 2000s, the Secretariat has argued that no additional legal power from states is needed to develop state protection measures. By 2012, some Member States felt that the IAEA was not prepared to share information with them on how the Agency intended to develop protection measures.